Abstract
Introduction
With the extensive use of Internet the possibilities of exposing sensitive information to intruders increases. Intrusion is a set of actions which attempt to comprise the confidentiality, denial of resources or unauthorized use of resources [1] . Intrusion Detection System (IDS) is used to detect various intrusions in network environment and to prevent information from malicious attackers [2] . Detection is not introduced to replace prevention-based techniques such as authentication and access control; instead, it is intended to complement existing security measures and detect actions that bypass the security monitoring and control component of the system [3] .
A good IDS identifies all possible intrusions and recommends actions to stop the attacks. When an intruder attacks a system, the ideal response of the system is to stop the activity. Traditional IDS have a central manager which attack and overload when there are many requests from clients [4] . The two data sources that relied in traditional intrusion detection are log files and network traffic. The log files are used to record the user's activity and the network traffic contains many potential threats.
The design of IDS is based on the architecture that is durable and can survive when there is an attack. So the research on IDS design architecture is durable and challenging. IDS can be classified into several types namely misuse intrusion detection and anomaly intrusion detection systems, network based and host based systems, and passive and reactive systems.
Misuse intrusion detection or pattern matching detection [5] , [6] uses signatures or rules that describe undesirable events. They perform some action when the pattern matches an event or data. This approach allows the detection of intrusions which the system has learned their signatures perfectly. Anomaly intrusion detection [7] , [8] , [9] are designed to detect general misuse and attacks for which no signature exists. This attempts to construct a model according to the statical knowledge about the normal activity of the computer system.
In a network-based system, (NIDS) the individual packets flowing through a network are analyzed. The NIDS can detect malicious packets that are designed to overlook a firewall's simplistic filtering rules. NDIS are placed at a strategic point or points within the network to monitor traffic to and from all devices on the network. In a host-based system, (HIDS) the IDS examines all the activity on each individual computer or host. HIDS consists of an agent on a host which identifies intrusions by analyzing system calls, application logs, file-system modifications and other host activities.
In a passive system, the IDS detect a potential security breach, logs the information and signal an alert. When suspicious or malicious traffic is detected an alert is generated and sent to the administrator or user and it is up to them to take action to block the activity or respond in some way. In a reactive system, the IDS respond to the suspicious activity by logging off a user or by reprogramming the firewall to block network traffic from the suspected malicious source.
When an intruder attacks a system, the ideal response of the system is to stop the activity. This should be done before that will damage or access sensitive information from the system. An ideal system satisfies many requirements for good intrusion detection system [10] , which are given as follows:
Adaptability:
The system must respond quickly to the ever changing methods of attack.
Concurrency:
The system must be able to handle concurrent attacks.
Efficiency and Reliability:
The system should be efficient, reliable, and resistant to degradation in a heterogeneous platform environment.
Escalating Behavior: The system must recognize escalating suspicious behavior on a single host or across multiple hosts.
Extensibility:
The system must be extensible; when new attacks are defined they can be added to those agents to which this type of attack is possible.
Flexibility:
The system must be flexible, so that any host can perform any subset of functionality.
Manual Control: The system must allow manual intervention. The system administrator can use any system to intervene and propagate the results to all the other relevant hosts.
Recognition:
The system must recognize initial suspect the triggering event.
Resistance to compromise Software: The system must protect itself from unauthorized use or attack.
Response:
The system components must take the appropriate action that corresponds with a level of alertness.
Scalability:
The system must scale as the network grows.
The remaining paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the related work done for intrusion detection. Section 3 dealt with the Distributed Intrusion Detection System (DIDS) overview. Section 4 describes a feature extraction intelligent ant colony based approach for optimizing the wrong false alarm rate. Section 5 gives the experimental results and analysis. Finally conclusions and future work is added in section 6.
Related Work
With the growth of computer and its applications, security issues like network intrusion and virus infection are becoming more serious. Before modern IDS, manual search for anomalies of intrusion detection is used. To perform this task manually log files are used and the manual process is not only strenuous and inaccurate, but also time consuming and man-power intensive. This process is irregularly constituted on actual attack or intrusion and the whole process required enormous investigation [11] .
In [12] , to overcome the drawbacks of traditional intrusion detection systems which have a central manager, peer-to-peer approaches in intrusion detection is suggested by applying a mobile agent migration strategy to collect information from direct linked neighbours. This agent based approach will decrease the overhead of each host in the network, reduce the security risk and achieve more accurate detections.
A Distributed Intrusion Detection system using Mobile Agents (DIDMA) [13] places static agents at every host and the network along with a centralized mobile agent dispatcher and IDS console. This approach provides better scalability and is platform independent but lacks security problems.
An Agent based Distributed Co-operative Model (ADCM) for distributed agents to perform intrusion detection in a distributed fashion are proposed in [14] . In ADCM, centralized analysis is avoided by performing the analysis at agent level and that give security events to those that had subscribed the service.
A completely DIDS based on distributed hash table to efficiently exchange and meta-alerts in a cooperative, self organizing and load balancing way was presented in [15] . The proposed approach have decentralized structure and has additional detection skills due to distributed information collection and subsequent correlation, no single point of failure and no bottlenecks compared to conventional IDS.
Distributed intrusion detection based on Clustering overcomes the drawbacks on labeled training data which are based on anomaly based IDS was presented in [16] , which employ clustering twice. First clustering is used to select anomalies at agent IDS and second to choose the true attack at central IDS. The agents are responsible for collecting data from data sources, normalizing and choosing anomalies from the analysis.
An autonomous and mobile agent based distributed intrusion detection is presented in [17] , which utilizes 'aglets' mobile agent platform. This system has five types of agents named administrator agents, analyzer agents, connection agents, crisis agents and update behavior agents, which interact with each other to perform the detection task.
An efficient and biologically inspired learning model for anomaly intrusion detection in the multiagent IDS [18] is designed for decentralized intrusion detection and prevention control in large switched networks. The proposed model called Ant Colony Clustering Model improves the existing ant-based clustering approach in searching for near-optimal clustering heuristic.
A multi-ant colonies approach for clustering data [19] that consists of parallel and independent ant colonies and a queen ant agent is presented. In this approach, each ant colony process takes different types of ants moving speed and different versions of the probability conversion function to generate various clustering results with an ant-based clustering algorithm. The result shows that the lowest outlier's strategy for selecting the current data set has the best performance quality.
Intrusion detection using an ensemble of intelligent paradigms approach of different soft computing and hard computing techniques for intrusion detection is presented in [20] . The performance of Artificial Neural Networks (ANNs), Support Vector Machines (SVMs) and Multivariate Adaptive Regression Splines (MARS) is studied. It is shown that ANNs, SVMs and MARS is superior to individual approaches for intrusion detection in terms of classification accuracy.
To identify the important features in building an IDS that is computationally efficient and effective are presented in [21] . The performance of two feature selection algorithms involving Bayesian Networks (BN) and Classification and Regression Trees (CART) and an ensemble of BN and CART is investigated. Results indicate that significant input feature selection is important to design an IDS that is lightweight, efficient and effective for real world detection systems.
Distributed Intrusion Detection System
Distributed Intrusion Detection System (DIDS) is developed to guard against some of the Network Security Monitor (NSM) deficiencies like an attacker who enters a system via a dial-up line and this may not generate any network activity by Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, Haystack Laboratory and the US Air Force. In DIDS, the host monitors and LAN monitors reports any interesting events, which may possibly dead to intrusive activity, to a centrally located DIDS director, which employs an expert system to detect possible attacks [22] . Figure 1 shows a generalized DIDS target environment. The DIDS architecture combines distributed monitoring and data reduction with centralized data analysis. DIDS architecture consists of DIDS director, a single host monitor per host and a single LAN monitor for each broadcast LAN segment in the network which is monitored. In DIDS, the host and LAN monitors report events, which possibly lead to intrusive activity, to a centrally-located DIDS director. The director employs an expert system to detect the possible intrusion attacks. This architecture provides accountability by trying the users with their actions.
The host and LAN monitors are responsible for the collection of evidence of suspicious activity and DIDS director is responsible for its evaluation. Reports are sent independently and asynchronously from the host The host monitor consists of host event generator and host agent. The agent generator collects and analysis audit records from the host operating system, in which, the audit records are scanned for notable events. The notable events are sent to the director of the next analysis. The LAN monitor consists of a LAN event generator and a LAN agent. The LAN event generator is a subset of NSM and is responsible to observe all the traffic on its segment of the LAN, in order to monitor host-to-host connections, services used and volume of traffic.
The DIDS director consists of three major components namely a communication manager, an expert system and a user interface. The communication manager is used to transfer data between the director and it accepts the notable event records from each host and LAN monitors and sends them to the expert system. It also sends request to the host and LAN monitors for information regarding a particular user.
The expert system is responsible for evaluating and reporting the security state of the monitored system and it receives the reports from the hosts and the LAN monitors. This makes inferences about the security of each individual host and the expert system is having simple learning capabilities.
Ant Colony Optimization based Distributed Intrusion Detection System
Ants are capable of finding the shortest path from a food source to their nest, and are adaptive to changes in the environment for finding a new shortest path once the old path is no longer feasible [24] . On the way ants deposit pheromone, a kind of cumarin which ants are able to smell by which they marks the route taken.
The concentration of pheromone on a certain path is an indication and with time the concentration of pheromone decreases due to diffusion effects [25] . The pheromone is used to probabilistically sample the search space. This behavior explains how they can find the shortest path. Figure 3 shows the ANT Colony optimization meta-heuristic with two routes from the source (nest) to destination (food). At the intersection (node B) ants select different branch. Since the below route is shorter than the upper one, the ants which take this path will reach the destination (food) first. After a short time the pheromone concentration on the shorter path will be higher than on the longer path, because the ants using the shorter path will increase the pheromone concentration faster. Thus the shortest path will be identified. The ANT Colony meta-heuristic model is given below: The basic ingredient of ANT Colony algorithm is a constructive heuristic for probabilistically constructing solutions taken from a finite set of solution compounds v = { v 1 , v 2 , ……….., v n }. The process of constructing solutions can be regarded as the path on the construction graph G = (V, E), whose vertexes are the solution components V and the set E are the links or connections. The allowed path on G are implicitly defined by the solution construction mechanism and the choice of solution component N(s p ) at each construction step done probabilistically with respect to the pheromone value T i , and the set of all pheromone tail parameters is denoted by T. The probabilities for choosing the next solution component called transition probabilities is given by
where, η is the weighting function that depends on the current partial solution and assigns a heuristic value η(v j ) to each feasible solution component v j ε N(s p Pheromone Update has a evaporation phase that uniformly decrease its values which is used to avoid a rapid convergence of the algorithm towards a suboptimal region. Daemon actions can be used to implement centralized actions which cannot be performed by a single ant. It decides to deposit extra pheromone on the solution components that belong to the best solution.
). α and β are positive parameters whose values determines the relation between pheromone information and heuristic information, the interval is taken as 0.05.
Experimental Results and Analysis
The dataset was prepared from the 1998 DARPA intrusion detection evaluation program by MIT Lincoln Labs [26] . Each record of the datasets consists of 9 different features and 1 record type. Out of 9 features, 6 features are used in ant colony optimization algorithm, which are connection duration, protocol, source port, destination port, source IP address and destination IP address. The dataset contains 24 attack types and are categorized into four namely DoS, Probe, R2L and U2R. The dataset has 41 attributes for each connection record and a class label. Totally, 22,000 attack data and 10,000 normal data are prepared for training and another set of 22,000 attack instances and 10,000 normal data are selected as the testing data. The training and testing data are selected randomly; both of them have the same approximate distribution as the KDD data set.
The total CPU usage for DIDS occurs due to cluster head formation, Network response agent. Figure 4 shows the CPU usage time and from the figure ANT based DIDS is having less CPU usage than DIDS. It is clear that overall ANT based DIDS is far better than the DIDS. From the analysis intrusion detection programs are used by more people as a component of corporate security [27] which is shown in figure 5 . Figure 6 and 7 shows the performance analysis in terms of average attack detection rate and false positive rate. It is found that using less number of PCs can yield best detection rate. Moreover, ANT based DIDS performs more stable that the normal DIDS architecture. 
Conclusions and Future Work
In this paper, an intelligent meta-heuristic DIDS architecture for scalable intrusion detection and prevention in distributed networks is presented. The empirical results show that ANT based DIDS can significantly improve the overall performance of existing DIDS. Also, it is seen that the high detection rate and recognize normal network traffic with low false positive rate.
In order to optimize the performance of intrusion detection tools, heuristic approaches could be developed to reduce audits that relied on preestablished relationships among attributes. IDS face several daunting but exciting challenges in the future in the arena of network security, to provide more effective attack response mechanisms like shutting down or isolating the compromised systems
